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WALTER D. JAMES I11*

Financial Institutions and
Hazardous Waste Litigation:
Limiting the Exposure to
Superfund Liability
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),' specifically aimed at silencing the "not me" responses elicited when response cost litigation is
commenced. CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 2 provides that the parties responsible for a hazardous waste disposal facility may be held liable under

CERCLA and SARA (Superfund) to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), a state agency, or to a private party, when response costs are
incurred for the cleanup of the hazardous waste disposal facility. The
recoverable costs include the actual costs incurred by the EPA, the state
agency, or the private party, in cleaning up the site, damages for the3
destruction of or loss of natural resources, and health assessment costs.
It may seem axiomatic to state that the responsible parties are liable
for cleanup costs incurred until it is realized that the potential for liability
continues even when the hazardous waste disposal facility has become
*B.S., Political Science, University of Nebraska, 1984; J.D., University of Nebraska College of
Law, 1987; Member of Texas Bar, 1987.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, codifiedat 26 U.S.C. §§4611-4682 (1982), and at 42 U.S.C. §6911 (a),
H 9601-9657 (1982).
2. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §9601-9657 (West Supp. 1987).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(a) (West Supp. 1987) sets forth the scope of liability under CERCLA and
SARA.
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such persons, by any other party or entity,
at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
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inactive4 and then subsequently changes ownership one or more times.5
Thus, definition of responsible parties may include the new owner even
though the new owner did not participate in the creation or maintenance

of the contaminated site. Further, recent case law has set financial institutions in a somewhat tenuous position as they expose themselves to
potential liability as responsible parties under Superfund in the event they
foreclose on a secured interest in a hazardous waste disposal facility.6

In order to fully appreciate the impact of the imposition of Superfund
liability upon a financial institution, it will be necessary to examine the
specific liability7 and definitional provisions8 of Superfund, and the case
emiment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the
amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall accrue
from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or
(ii) the date of the expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid
balance of the amounts recoverable under this section shall be the same rate as specified
for interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under
subchapter A of chapter 98 of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to
interest under this subsection, the term "comparable maturity" shall be determined with
reference to the date on which interest accruing under this subsection commences.
Id.

4. Inactive in the sense that the site is no longer being used as a dump site or treatment facility
for hazardous materials, not that there is no longer any activity occurring at all, such as an actual
release or leaching of chemicals into and through the soil or into and through water supplies.
5. Mott, Liabilityfor Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 379, 413 (1982).

Allocation of liability among successive owners of a disposal site has been one of the
most vexatious issues in case law to date. Each owner will have varying degrees of
knowledge and participation in the disposal actions and often the most culpable party
will have become insolvent. Accordingly, the principles for resolving the allocation of
liability between prior and current owners are key questions in abatement litigation.
Since Superfund liability arises out of ownership status and applies despite subsequent transfers of
title, the liability runs with the land unless the owner qualifies under the innocent landowner provision
of 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (35)(A) (West Supp. 1987). See infra note 33 for the text of 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601 (35)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
6. See United States v. Maryland Bank &Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986). As pointed
out in Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 ENvTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10165 (1986): "Liability for hazardous substances cleanups, like the flu,
eventually seems to get around to everyone with any contact with the infected site and it is now
beginning to make bankers sick." Id. But see United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985), 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20994 (1985).
7. See supra note 3.

8. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(20)(A), 9601(35) (West Supp. 1987).
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law in which the liability provisions of Superfund have been interpreted,
applied and enforced. Finally, recommendations will be made by which
a financial institution may attempt to reduce its exposure to liability
through preventive measures.

LIABILITY, COVERED PERSONS, AND SCOPE:
42 U.S.C.A. SECTION 9607(a) (WEST SUPP. 1987)
Under Superfund, responsible parties may be held liable for: (1) governmental response costs; (2) private party response costs consistent with
the National Contingency Plan; (3) damages for injury to natural resources;
and (4) health assessment costs.9 The key to liability is in defining
"responsible parties," since the present owner may have innocently purchased the contaminated site, and since the statutory scheme provides
for strict liability for those who are found to be responsible parties.'"
While the statutory scheme of liability does not provide a system of
allocation of liability when there are several defendants," those examining
the liability provisions in depth generally agree that apportionment of
liability, rather than joint and several liability, should be applied to those

situations in which there are multiple defendants found to be liable.' 2
Liability provisions with respect to responsible parties under Superfund
apply to virtually any individual or corporation that holds any indicia of
9. See supra note 3.
10. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability (Superfund) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 9 (1982). See In re T.P. Long
Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bkrtcy. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F.Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
!1. Mott, supra note 5, at 405. Although there is no express provision for joint and several
liability in Superfund, reference to legislative history clearly shows that common law principles of
joint and several liability are applicable. H.R. Rep. No. 253(i), 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2835, 2856.
12. Grad, supra note 10, at 5. See Superfund § 301 (e) Study Group Report to Congress, Appendix
C, August 1982, Problems of Responsibility and Apportionment of Damages in Hazardous Waste
Cases and Liability of a Current Landowner for Injuries Caused by Hazardous Conditions Created
by a Previous Owner, reprinted in 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 30031 (1982) (hereinafter
Report). See also Light, Modest Proposal to Codify the Fair and Just View of the Justice Department
on CERCLA. 16 ENVmL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10064 (1986).
Finally, the United States has officially come around to the view that joint and several
liability does not apply in some Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 107 cases, even though the harm at the site is
indivisible. The government adopts this view in its recent brief in Mola Development
Corp. v. United States (No. CV 82-0819-RMT (JRx), E.L.R. PEND. Lrr. 65891 (C.D.
Cal. brief filed Dec. 16, 1985)) in a December 1985 pleading styled, "Response to
the Court's Order for Briefing on the United States Counterclaim."
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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ownership, unless exempted.' 3 For example, Congress has specifically
exempted from liability those holding "indicia of ownership primarily to
protect [a] security interest." 4 Of vital interest to those holding indicia
of ownership via a security interest is the liability which may be allocated
to them, or imposed upon them, in the event that the primarily responsible
party defaults on the secured obligation and the financial institution must
act to protect its investment through the foreclosure process. The question
then becomes: Is the foreclosing financial institution an owner of a contaminated site under Superfund liability provisions and thus a responsible
party and liable for response costs? The answer to the question depends
upon numerous variables which may trip up the unaware and naive, and
thus expose the lender to Superfund liability.' 5
While courts generally give a broad interpretation to the liability provisions of Superfund,"6 courts are also cognizant of the exceptions and
defenses. 7 The usefulness of the exemption and/or defenses by a financial
institution, however, is dependent upon the financial institution maintaining the proper distance from the hazardous waste disposal facility."
13. CERCLA § 107(a) makes four categories of persons potentially liable for releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances from facilities: current owners or operators
of facilities, those who owned or operated the facilities at the time of disposal, those
who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous substances (generators), and those who
accepted wastes for transport to a disposal facility "from which there is a release or
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance."
Reed, CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10395, 10400
(1985). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 10165: "Three categories of landowners may be liable
under CERCLA § 107(a): current owners, owners during dumping, and owners who abandon sites.
Anyone with title to a CERCLA site has good reason to fear liability." Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A) (1982). The statute provides a definition of "owner" and/or "operator" for the liability provisions of CERCLA.
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, (iii) in the case
of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure,
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government,
any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of the vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility....
Id.
15. Knowledge of the existence of hazardous chemicals is sufficient to impose liability upon the
subsequent purchaser as is the lack of diligent inquiry when purchasing. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9,084-85 (1986).
16. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 283 (Bkrtcy. 1985). "Courts have generally
held, however, that the liability provisions under CERCLA should be given a broad construction."
Id. (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F.Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984); State ex ret. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982)),
17. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bkrtcy. 1985); United States v. Mirabile,
No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) 15 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20994 (1985).
18. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 FSupp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
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The imposition of, or allocation of liability among successive landowners,' 9 and any imposition of, or allocation of, liability that may be assessed
to an "innocent" landowner vis-a-vis prior owners will become very
important to the lender holding the security interest, 2' since cleanup costs
are extremely high2 and eventually the lender will wish to dispose of the
security interest collateral. 2
The liability provisions of Superfund may be enforced merely by virtue
of ownership status; however, commentators contend that mere ownership
alone should not be sufficient to establish Superfund liability, 23 but rather

that traditional case law be followed.24 Superfund provides a narrow

escape from liability to the financial institution which makes loans to
industrial concerns which have hazardous waste by-products. However,
19. See supra note 5. Various factors will either increase or decrease the potential for liability.
20. See Mott, supra note 5, at 414. See also Reed, supra note 13, at 10401.
CERCLA imposes a sort of absolute liability on owners. They are liable even if
they had no involvement with disposal activities of a lessee or were not the proximate
cause of releases resulting principally from the activities of a previous owner. Current
owners who are not operators may be able to use the § 107(b) third party defense if
the hazard was caused solely by a prior owner or operator with whom the current
owner had no contractual connection and can seek indemnification or contribution.
Id. (footnotes omitted). An important question yet to be answered is how the courts will apply 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601 (35)(A) (West Supp. 1987) "contractual relations" to the foreclosing lender situation. See intra note 105.
2 1. See Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past, Uncertain Future, 64
MIcH B. J. 169, 171-72 (1985).
22. 42 U.S.C. §9607(e)(1) (1982) provides:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be
effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any
person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this section, to any
other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall
bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement
for any liability under this section.
Id. See Mandan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F.Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984) (Seller may limit
any liability it may have by a hold harmless clause or a release clause vis-a-vis the Buyer, but not
any liability it may have vis-a-vis the Government under CERCLA). See also Reed, supra note 13,
at 10401; and Comment, supra note 6, at 10166.
23. See generally Report, supra note 12.
24. A good example of traditional case law is State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp.,
151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). The Exxon decision held that
a current owner is not liable for a previous owner's spillage which polluted the groundwater. See
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978),
aff d sub nom., Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).
See also Mott, supra note 5, at 414.
Thus, the innocent purchaser of an inactive site, who unknowingly acquires buried
drums, contaminated soil, or polluted groundwater, has been protected from the severe
consequences of liability for previous owners' conduct. In fact, a vendor's failure to
disclose these conditions may create a cause of action against the prior owner.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The traditional case law is discussed in depth in text accompanying notes
108 to 142.
SARA, 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35) (West Supp. 1987) removes liability from the landowner who
can prove innocence with regard to hazardous substance releases. See infra text accompanying notes
26 to 43.
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the narrow avenue available to financial institutions for escaping liability
is wholly consistent with recent court decisions involving Superfund liability and common law liability of non-financial institutions.25 Further, it
does not preclude the careful financial institution from protecting itself
from Superfund liability through negotiated indemnification clauses with
its industrial customers.
The definitional scope of liability for a responsible party was further
widened when Congress reauthorized CERCLA with SARA on July 3 1,
1986,26 though, definitional adjustments were made to protect the truly
innocent landowner7 The reauthorization which became law on October
17, 1986,2' was a compromise combination of the Senate bill29 and the
House bill." The Senate bill did not contain any provisions which would
change CERCLA liability provisions; however, the House amendment
did allow the innocent landowner the opportunity to demonstrate his
innocence in connection with a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.3 2
The ensuing compromise by the conference committee resulted in adoption of the House amendment, adding to the definitional section a subsection covering real estate transactions with innocent subsequent
purchasers." The new definition clarifies the intent of Superfund to impose
25. State of N.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (current owner held liable
for activities of previous owner). United States v. Carolawn Co., No. 83-2162-0 (D.S.C. June 15,
1984), 14 ENVTL. L. REP.(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20696 (1984) (company held title for one hour); United
States v. Argent Corp., No. CIV 83-0523 BB (D. N. Mex. May 4, 1984), 14 ENvTL. L. REP.
(ENvTL. L. INST.) 20616 (1984) (lessor held liable for disposal activities of lessee).
26. Comment, CERCLA Reauthorization: The Wise Demise of § 114 (c) and Exxon v. Hunt, 16
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10286 n.l (1986).
27. See infra notes 32 and 33.
28. Pub. L. No. 499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
29. S. Res. 51, 99th Cong., IstSess. (1985). See EPA Draft Side-By-Side Comparison of the
Provisions of CERCLA, EPA Amendments, Senate, House Superfund Bills, 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1894 (1986) (hereinafter Comparisons).
30. H.R. Res. 2817, 99th Cong., IstSess. (1985). See Comparisons, supra note 29, at 1894.
On Dec. 10, 1985, the House passed H.R. 2005 (formerly H.R. 2817). See 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1587 (1985).
31. Comparisons, supra note 29, at 1984.
32. "§ 107(m) Removes liability from landowner who can prove innocence with regard to hazardous substance release." Id. at 1933.
The purpose of the House amendment was to eliminate liability which might exist
under section 107 for landowners who acquired title to real property after the time
hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants had come to be located thereon and
who, although they exercise due care with respect to discovering such materials, were
nonetheless ignorant of their presence.
H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H9084 (1986).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
The term "contractual relationships," for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) includes,
but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or
possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was
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liability upon parties responsible for the creation and maintenance of the
hazardous waste site and not upon innocent subsequent purchasers who

are least responsible for the site and who are least likely to be able to
afford cleanup costs.'
Under the new definitional provision, the subsequent purchaser will
not incur liability if he exercises the "requisite due care." 35 The "requisite
due care" requirement has two prongs which must be satisfied in order

to discharge potential liability. The first prong requires examination of
the buyer's knowledge as to the existence of hazardous substances at the
time of purchase. 36 The second prong requires examination of the actions
taken once the buyer learns there are hazardous substances on or in the
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance
on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat,
or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of
eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
Id.
34. H.R. Rep. 962, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9084-85 (1986).
This new definition of contractual relationships is intended to clarify and confirm that
under limited circumstances landowners, who acquire property without knowing of
any contamination at the site and without reason to know of any contamination (or as
otherwise noted in the amendment) may have a defense to liability under section 107
and therefore should not be held liable for cleaning up the site if such persons satisfy
the remaining requirements of section 107(b)(3). A person who acquires property
through a land contract or deed or other instrument transferring title or possession that
meets the requirements of this definition may assert that an act or omission of a third
party should not be considered to have occurred in connection with a contractual
relationship as identified in section 107(b) and therefore is not a bar to the defense.
In the limited circumstances identified in this definition, such landowners are entitled
to the defense if they exercise the requisite due care upon learning of such release or
threat of release ...
The Conferees recognized that the due care requirement embodied in section 107(b)(3)
only requires such person to exercise that degree of due care which is reasonable under
the circumstances. The requirement would include those steps necessary to protect the
public from a health or environmental threat. Finally, the precautions against foreseeable acts of third parties requirement of section 107(b)(3)(b) does not prevent a subsequent purchaser after contamination has occurred from claiming the defense, but
only comes into play after the landowner acquires the property. Foreseeability must
be considered in light of the specific circumstances of each case. The provisions of
section 101(35)(B) as to "reason to know" govern the purchaser's responsibility with
regard to acts of third persons prior to the purchase.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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land.3 7 The innocence of the subsequent purchaser as to knowledge is
measured by "good commercial or customary practices." 3" Once the prior
lack of knowledge of the subsequent landowner is established under the
"good commercial or customary practices" standard, the subsequent purchaser must demonstrate that, once knowledge was gained, he used due
care towards the hazardous substances and acted to protect himself and
others from the further foreseeable consequences of a release or threatened
release. 39

The amended definitions of Superfund liability set forth criteria for
liability remarkably similar to the position set forth by the Restatement

(Second) of Torts (Restatement [Second]).' The point of departure between
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize
liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account any
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of
the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known
or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect
such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(3)(a), (b) (1982):
There shall be no liability...
.if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions ...
One who takes possession of land upon which there is an existing structure or other
40.
artificial condition unreasonably dangerous to persons or property outside of the land
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the condition after, but only
after,
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition, and
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by
it, and
(c) he has failed, after a reasonable opportunity, to make it safe or otherwise to
protect such persons against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 366 (1977).

A possessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused while he is in
possession by an abatable artificial condition on the land, if the nuisance is otherwise
actionable, and
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition and the nuisance or
unreasonable risk of nuisance involved, and
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by
it, and
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the two is in the action required once knowledge is gained. The Restatement (Second) requires the subsequently purchasing landowner to
abate the condition within a reasonable period of time once he knows of
the condition, "or otherwise to protect such persons against it. ",4' On the
other hand, Superfund liability provisions would require only taking pre-

cautions against foreseeable acts or omissions. 42 It seems that the intent

was to spare the innocently purchasing landowner the high cost of abate-

ment required at common law.
A general reading of the amended provisions does not preclude a finan-

cial institution from taking advantage of the liability exemption; however,
the legislative history indicates that the commercial transaction should be
(c) he has failed after a reasonable opportunity to take reasonable steps to abate the
condition or to protect the affected persons against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (1977).
In a report to Congress the study group explained and analyzed the Restatement (Second) position:
The SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, together with Prosser and other commentators,
takes the view that a vendee becomes liable for a hazardous condition on his land only
after he is given notice of the conditions, constructive or express, and has had a
reasonable time to correct it...
The SECOND RESTATEMENT thus imposes liability on the landowner only if he knows
or should have known of the dangerous condition. In the case of latent defects, "the
vendee or lessee may have enough in the way of information or warning to lead a
reasonable man to investigate, so that he 'should know."' In a hazardous waste case,
this could occur when the title search prior to purchase disclosed that the land was at
one time owned by a chemical company or similar industrial concern putting the new
owner on notice that an investigation for latent hazards is necessary. The care the
vendee should give the investigation should reflect the nature of the prior use....
Similarly, former ownership by a chemical company may well point to the need for
intensive inspection of the land more than former ownership by a less hazardous
enterprise.
The SECOND RESTATEMENT also draws a distinction between situations where the
vendee may reasonably assume that persons affected have consented to be exposed to
the danger, and situations where such consent could not, reasonably, have been given.
Consent may not be assumed in the case of public nuisance .... Consent may be
assumed in some private nuisance cases, but the condition . . .threatening bodily
harm to persons outside of the land, .

.

. may yield the conclusion that .

.

. no

reasonable person would give his consent to such an interference. It is enough that
the landowner knows or should have known of the condition.
The last prerequisite to liability under the SECOND RESTATEMENT'S formulation is
that the landowner have failed to abate the condition within a reasonable period of
time. This "reasonable" period runs from the moment a request to abate has been
made, or, in cases where no request is necessary, from the moment the owner knows
or should know that the condition exists.... Even though repair of the condition
may take some time, the possessor may be required in the interim to post a warning,
or take such other steps as may be reasonable, for the protection of such persons,
pending the repair or removal.
Report, supra note 12, at 3032-33 (footnotes omitted).
41. Id.

42. See 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(b)(3) (1982); supra note 34.
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examined more closely than the residential transaction and that the commercial entity should be held to a higher standard of due diligence and
care than the residential consumer.43
LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER CERCLA
A recent article" provided a brief outline of the risks inherent in the
transacting of industrial loans by the unaware lender:
Recent cases have exposed lenders to significant risks under CERCLA
that their security interests may be seized to pay governmental cleanup
costs. The cases compel commercial real estate lenders to evaluate
carefully each proposed mortgage transaction or foreclosure and to
seek additional contractual or financial protections. While not absolute, it is becoming increasingly clear that current interpretations of
CERCLA impose significant risks that must be met.45
Three recent cases discuss the Superfund liability of a financial institution upon foreclosure of its security interest in the hazardous waste
disposal facility; however, the cases do not do so at any great depth.'
The cases set forth two separate tests for imposing liability upon a foreclosing financial institution. All of the cases suggest without discussion
that third-party defenses may be available and may pose "a potential
route of escape open to lenders." 47 Also of relevance are cases decided
in state courts under so-called mini-Superfund statutes which discuss the
response cost liability which may be imposed upon a subsequent owner.'
Financial institutions are usually the only "deep pocket" available when
the party or parties primarily responsible become insolvent. While attain43. H.R. Rep. 962, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9085 (1986): ("Those engaged
in commercial transactions (ofreal estate] should, however, be held to a higher standard [of inquiry]
than those who are engaged in private residential transactions.").
44. Fleischaker & Mitchell, The Insecurities of Security Interests in Hazardous-Waste Cases, 9
L. J.18, Sept. 15, 1986.
45. Id. at 20.

NAT'L

46. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 ESupp. 573 (D.Md. 1986); United States v.
Mirabile, No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985), 15 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20994
(1985); In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
47. Fleischaker & Mitchell, supra note 44, at 20. The cases include Maryland Bank & Trust,
632 F.Supp. 573; Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. ReP. 20992; Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Argent Corp., CIV 83-0523 BB (D. N. Mex., May 4, 1984).
48. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 387 A.2d 142 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978), ajfd sub noan.; Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court in Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1985), held that CERCLA
preempted state Superfund legislation. Congress responded by deleting § 114(c) (42 U.S.C. § 9614(c)
(1982)).
Although the Supreme Court interpreted the statute in the most logical fashion, the
opinion produced a result at odds with CERCLA's deeper purpose of expediting cleanup
actions. As it became clear that the extent of the hazardous waste cleanup problem in
America was more widespread than CERCLA could effectively control by itself,
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ing the desired outcome of cleaning up the contaminated site, the imposition of liability upon a foreclosing lender merely because the foreclosing
lender is a "deep pocket" which is connected with the primarily responsible party ignores the basic goal of Superfund: that of imposing liability
upon parties responsible for the hazard. 9 Further, imposing liability upon
the financial institution as a landowner merely because of its status as
landowner also side-steps the real issue of liability. Under both situations,
the causation element normally required for tort liability is absent.s"
Liability of a Financial Institution Upon Foreclosure of Its Security
Interest in a Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust s'
In the early 1970s, Maryland Bank and Trust loaned money to Hershel
McLeod Sr. to operate a trash and garbage business on his farm.-2 Mr.
McLeod operated the trash and garbage business until 1980, accepting
hazardous chemical waste for disposal. 3 The bank was aware that the
farm was being operated as a trash and garbage business.'"In 1980, Mr.
McLeod's son, Mark, purchased the business from his father with the
proceeds of a loan from Maryland Bank and Trust, 5 and in 1981, the
bank foreclosed on the loan to Mark McLeod for nonpayment.5 6 The bank
subsequently purchased the farm at the foreclosure sale for $381,500."
drafters of the reauthorization bill realized that state efforts would be necessary in

addition to what they could provide through CERCLA. Even though it might sacrifice
some measure of coordinated efficiency .... Congress is expected to remove the
law's preemptive section.

Comment, CERCLA Reauthorization: The Wise Demise of §114(c) and Exxon v. Hunt, 16 ENVTL.
L. RE '. (ENvmL. L. INsT.) 10286, 10291 (Oct. 1982).
49. "The goal of assuring that those who caused chemical harm bear the cost of that harm is
addressed in the reported legislation by the imposition of liability." S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess, 13 (1980).
50. Id. In Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. at 576 the court listed the elements of the cause
of action under CERCLA:
To establish liability under section 107(a) of the Act, the government must establish
the following:
I) The site is a "facility";
2) A "release" or "threatened release" of any "hazardous substance" from the site
has occurred;
3) The release or threatened release has caused the United States to incur "response
costs"; and
4) The defendant is one of the persons designated as a party liable for costs.
Id. See, Shore Realty Corp., 759 F2d at 1044 (causation does not matter).
51. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
52. Id. at 575.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol, 28

Instead of selling the business immediately, the bank held on to the farm

for undisclosed reasons. 5" In late 1983, the EPA began cleaning up the
farm, removing numerous drums of hazardous waste and contaminated
soil.59 When Maryland Bank and Trust refused to pay the cleanup bill,
the EPA sued the bank, filing a motion for summary judgment on the

basis of the undisputed facts.' The bank also filed a motion for summary
judgment claiming the security interest exemption under 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 9601 (20)(A). 6'
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ruled
against Maryland Bank and Trust and granted the EPA's motion for summary judgment as to the issue of liability under Section 9607(a)().62 The
court determined that the exemption allowed by subsection (20)(A) only
applied when the security interest existed at the time cleanup measures
began and that once the financial institution foreclosed on its security
interest, and then subsequently purchased the security at the foreclosure
sale, the financial institution was no longer protecting a security interest
within the meaning of the exemption provided by subsection (20)(A) but
was, in fact, protecting an investment.6 3 Therefore, the court held that

the bank was liable as an owner under the Superfund liability provisions
for the cleanup of the contaminated site.

The court rejected the arguments put forth by Maryland Bank and
Trust" holding that if the court
and Trust, the bank would be
was that Maryland Bank and
responsibility on the taxpayers
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

allowed the exemption to Maryland Bank
unjustly enriched. The court's rationale
Trust's arguments would place cleanup
with the bank reaping the benefits. 65 "In

Id.
Id. at 576.
id.
Id. at 582.
Id.
The court stated:
The exemption of subsection (20)(A) covers only those persons who, at the time of
the cleanup, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the
land. The verb tense of the exclusionary language is critical. The security interest must
exist at the time of the cleanup. The mortgage held by M B & T (the security interest)
terminated at the foreclosure sale of May 15, 1982, at which time it ripened into full
title.
Id. at 579 (citing 55 Am. JtR.2d Mortgages, §785 (1971)). The court suggests that the bank may
only incur liability if it purchases the security at the foreclosure sale.
64. Defendant had raised three arguments: that § 107(a)(l) applies only to owners who are
operators; that the § 101(20) security interest exemption remained in effect after foreclosure and insulated the bank from liability; and that the bank was protected by the
third-party defense because it had no connection with McLeod's hazardous waste
business. The court flatly rejected the first two arguments and reserved judgment on
the third until after trial.
Comment, supra note 6,at 10167.
65.
The interpretation of section 101(20)(A) urged upon the Court by M B & T runs
counter to the policies underlying CERCLA. Under the scenario put forward by the
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essence, the defendant's [Maryland Bank and Trust] position would con-

vert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to the security of loans with
polluted properties.""

The court set out a definite rule by which financial institutions may
gauge their potential liability in the event the lender is in the position to
foreclose on its security interest. The rule seems to be that any exercise

of financial control over any aspect of the business by the foreclosing
lender will trigger Superfund liability. The court declined to give a broad
interpretation to the liability exemptions67 and disagreed with the holding

in United States v. Mirabile, a case in which the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania insulated a lender which
foreclosed on a hazardous waste facility from Superfund liability.' In the
event the foreclosing lender does purchase the site at the subsequent
foreclosure sale, it should not retain the property for a period of three
years; in other words, financial institutions should learn from the example
set by Maryland Bank and Trust, which held onto the foreclosed property
for four years, unless they are prepared to pay cleanup costs.7"
7

United States v. Mirabile 1
Unlike the decision in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, the
decision issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania exempted a financial institution which foreclosed on its
security interest from Superfund liability. In Mirabile, the American Bank
bank, the federal government alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site,
while the former mortgagee-turned-owner, would benefit from the cleanup by the
increased value of the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee
could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective purchasers would be faced
with potential CERCLA liability, and would shy away from the sale. Yet once the
property has been cleared at the taxpayers' expense and becomes marketable, the
mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a position to sell the site at a profit.
Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. at 580 (emphasis added).
66. Id. The court then issued an admonition to financial institutions in general: "Financial institutions are in a position to investigate and discover potential problems in their secured properties.
For many lending institutions, such research is routine. CERCLA will not absolve them from
responsibility for their mistakes of judgment." Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985), 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20992 (1985).
69. Id., at 20992-93.
70. Because M B & T has held the property for such an extended period of time, this
Court need not consider the issue of whether a secured party which purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly resold it would be precluded from
asserting the section 101(20)(A) exemption. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that a former mortgagee that purchased
the property at a foreclosure sale and assigned it four months later was exempt from
liability.
Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp at 579 n.5 (citation omitted).
71. 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) at 20992 (1985).
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and Trust Company foreclosed on property containing hazardous waste."
The property in question, prior to 1976, had been owned by Arthur
Mangels who operated a paint manufacturing business." The business
generated hazardous waste by-products which were stored on-site in drums.74
In 1976, Turco Coatings, Inc., took over manufacturing operations at the
site and continued to store the hazardous waste by-products in drums onsite." Turco Coatings, Inc. ceased operations in December 1980, and the
American Bank and Trust Company foreclosed the following August.76
At the sheriff's sale, American Bank and Trust successfully bid on the
property; however, the bank subsequently assigned the bid to the Mirabiles."
The EPA commenced cleanup of the site and sued for the response
costs, joining Mangels, Turco, American Bank and Trust Company and
the Mirabiles. The American Bank and Trust Company argued that "a
secured creditor's exercise of financial control over a debtor should not
bring the creditor within the scope of CERCLA liability."" The court
agreed with American Bank and Trust Company that the mere exercise
of financial control over any aspect of the business was not sufficient to
impose CERCLA liability; however, the court did state that if the lender
exercised any control over day-to-day operations, Superfund liability may
attach.'
The two cases, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust and United
States v. Mirabile, on their faces, appear to take opposite positions,
deciding the individual cases on separate policy guidelines.8 ' One com72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 20993.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20995.
rThe exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor does not become
overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of a facility, the creditor
may not be held liable for cleanup costs. The difficulty arises, of course, in determining
how far a secured creditor may go in protecting its financial interests before it can be
said to have acted as an owner or operator within the meaning of the statute.

Id.
80. [lIn enacting CERCLA Congress manifested its intent to impose liability upon those
who were responsible for and profited from improper disposal practices. Thus, it would
appear that before a secured creditor such as ABT may be held liable, it must, at a
minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site.

Id. at 20996.
81. The Mirabile court was primarily concerned with giving full effect to the security
interest exemption.... The Maryland Bank & Trust court, on the other hand, principally wanted to avoid establishing a rule that would allow private parties to profit
from government cleanup of CERCLA sites.... In many respects, then, Mirabile
and Maryland Bank & Trust are almost like opposite sides of the coin.
Comment, supra note 6, at 10168.
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mentator has suggested that one explanation for the difference between
the two decisions is the title theories of the respective states."2 Under
Maryland law, the mortgagee holds legal title to the mortgaged property
until the mortgage is paid in full.8" Maryland is thus known as a title
theory state.84 On the other hand, Pennsylvania is classified as an intermediate theory state, under which the mortgagor holds legal title to the
mortgaged property while the mortgage is in effect.8 5 The mortgagee is
entitled to possession only upon default.86 Under this analysis, Maryland
Bank and Trust was an "owner" while the American Bank and Trust was
not since it did not hold legal title.
The same commentator suggested a second basis for reconciling the
two decisions defining landowner for the purposes of liability.8 7 The bank
in Mirabile foreclosed on the property, successfully bid on the property
at the subsequent foreclosure sale and then assigned the bid to the Mirabiles all before the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
informed any party of the existence of toxic waste and before the EPA
commenced cleanup actions.8 8 Therefore, "the bank in Mirabile may not
have been liable as an owner at all. There was no dumping at the Mirabile
property while the bank held title after foreclosure; the bank did not
abandon the site; and it was not the owner when the cleanup was performed." 9 However, neither of the two theories adequately explains the
difference between the two decisions.
Overall, the only factor which may truly reconcile the two decisions
is the length of the respective banks' ownership and the actions taken to
protect the investment or to protect the security interest. Maryland Bank
and Trust held title to the property for nearly four years;' in comparison,
the American Bank and Trust Company assigned its high bid at the
foreclosure sale only four months after the foreclosure sale. 9 It may
82. Id. ("As the Maryland Bank & Trust court suggested, duration of the bank's ownership is
one basis for reconciling the two cases. Indeed, the bank in Mirabile may never have taken legal
title, ....").
83. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. at 579.

84. G. PINDAR,

AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW,

§20-13 n.2 (1976).

85. Id.
86. The right to possession is retained by the mortgagor until default, but after default possession
automatically accrues to the mortgagee.
87. Comment, supra note 6, at 10166 defined the scope of owner liability as follows:
The scope of landowner liability thus is . . . not all-inclusive. One who owned a
CERCLA site before or after it was used for hazardous substance disposal, who sold
the site before anyone incurred cleanup costs reimbursable under CERCLA, and who
never operated the site, apparently is not liable.
Id.
88. United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP., at 20993. See notes 77 and 78, and accompanying text.
89. Comment, supra note 6, at 10168.
90. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. at 579.
91. Mirabile, 15 EN v. L. REP. at 20993; see Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. at 579.
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further be argued that Maryland Bank and Trust "participated in the

management of [the] . . . facility" 92 thus meeting the test set forth in

Mirabile of participation in the "day-to-day operational aspects of the

site."'9 3 While no hard evidence is available from the cases, the mere fact
that Maryland Bank and Trust held the site for nearly four years suggests

just such a conclusion.
Since no adequate rationale exists for reconciling the two decisions, a
foreclosing bank would be wise to follow in the footsteps of American
Bank and Trust Company. Precedent demonstrates that a foreclosing lender
may permissibly hold title for approximately four months but that holding

title for just under four years is not permissible. The cases leave a wide
void in which a foreclosing lender may be trapped.
In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc."
Although In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., was clothed in bankruptcy
proceedings rather than a Superfund action,95 the court was faced with a

claim made by the EPA for response costs against the estate, specifically
against funds in which BancOhio held a perfected security interest."
BancOhio held a perfected security interest in the personal property of
the debtor business, including a perfected security interest in drums con-

taining sulfur monochloride buried at the site.97 The EPA sought recovery

from the funds subjected to BancOhio's security interest because the
unencumbered assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the response
costs incurred by the EPA.9"
The court rejected the argument set forth by the EPA" finding that
BancOhio was not liable as an owner or operator under Superfund"I° and
92. 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A) (1982). For the text, see supra note 14.
93. Mirabile, 15 ENvmL. L. REP. at 20996.
94. In re T.P. Long Chemical, 45 B.R. 278 (Bkrtcy. 1985).
95. The T.P. Long Chemical Company, Inc. originally filed for reorganization under Chapter 11;
however, the court ordered it converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.,
45 B.R. at 280.
96. The court framed the issue as follows: "Is the EPA entitled to recover the cost of removing
the hazardous material from the funds in which BancOhio has a security interest?" Id. at 282.
97. Id. at 281.
98. Id. at 287.
99. The EPA argues that the trustee's obligation to abate the hazard would have extended
to BancOhio had it sought to sell its collateral pursuant to its security agreement. The
EPA then argues that this liability cannot be avoided by transferring the ownership of
the collateral.
Id. at 288. It might be argued that the security interest exemption was specifically inserted to facilitate
the transfer of collateral even though the collateral may be a hazardous waste disposal facility.
100.
The court must reject this argument. The court finds that even if BancOhio had
repossessed its collateral pursuant to its security agreement it would not be an "owner
or operator" as defined by CERCLA.... The only possible indicia of ownership
that can be attributed to BancOhio is that which is primarily to protect its security
interest. It is undisputed that BancOhio has not participated in the management of
the Long facility. Thus, BancOhio cannot be held liable as an owner or operator
under CERCLA.
ld. at 288-289.
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that, even as a matter of equity, the EPA could not recover response costs
from BancOhio.' 0 ' The court in this instance, like the court in Mirabile,
gave full effect to the security interest exemption, setting forth the criteria
that the financial institution must participate in the management of the
facility before a court would be able to impose liability under Superfund. °2
Under the three cases discussing financial institution liability for Superfund response costs upon foreclosure of the interest in the hazardous
waste disposal facility, it appears that the financial institution initially
should carefully consider the alternatives to foreclosure. If it becomes
evident that foreclosure is the only realistic alternative available, the
lender should foreclose on the interest. In the foreclosure process, however, the lender should take particular care to not become involved in
any day-to-day operations on the site. While these actions may not fully
relieve the financial institution from Superfund liability,' 3 it will certainly
put the financial institution in a better position to avail itself to the Mirabile
and T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. decisions. The financial institution may
also attempt to utilize third-party defenses," the success of which will
depend upon the financial institution's knowledge of the use of the loan,
the timing of the loan itself, and the interpretation placed upon the contractual relations 5 between the financial institution and the owners/operators of the now inactive hazardous waste disposal facility. "
101.

The court finds that, as a matter of equity, the EPA may not recoup its expenses
from BancOhio ....
It would be inequitable, however, to make BancOhio bear the
risk of all damage caused by property in which it holds a security interest.
Id. at 289.
102. Id. at 288, 289.
103. See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.Supp. 573 at note 6.
104. 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(3) (1982) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a)of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by(3) an act or omission of a third person other than.. . one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant ...
Id.
105. CERCLA provides a third party defense to take into account acts or omissions by third
parties. The defense does not apply when the acts are committed by an employee or agent of the
defendant, or if there is a contractual relationship between the third party and the defendant. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(a)(3) (1982). The definitional section states that the term "contractual relations"
will include most methods of real estate transfers and only excludes transfer in which the disposal
of the hazardous substance occurred prior to the purchase by the defendant and the defendant had
no reason to suspect that hazardous materials were located on, in, or at the site. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601
(35)(A) (West Supp. 1987). The defendant is then held to a "good commercial or customary practices"
standard. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
106. [lhf the bank's loans had nothing to do with the hazardous waste disposal and the
bank did not know about and reasonably should not have known about the activity,
it will likely be successful in its § 107(b)(3) defense ....
If the bank knowingly
loaned money for the hazardous waste disposal business, the bank clearly should
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The Liability of a Financial Institution as an "Innocent"
Subsequent Owner of an Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal
Facility
In a situation in which a financial institution forecloses on its security
interest in the inactive hazardous waste disposal facility after the EPA
has cleaned up the site and has been reimbursed for the cleanup by the
responsible party or parties,' the question becomes what potential liability awaits the financial institution as a subsequent landowner. The
question is not altogether easily answered." 8 Three cases which discuss
subsequent ownership liability will be examined. " The cases demonstrate
that the key to the imposition of liability upon a subsequent owner is the
be liable under the principle of "he who profited from the pollution should pay,"
which seems to underlie CERCLA. If the court denies the defense on the contractual
relationship issue, simply because the bank loaned money ... during the period in
which hazardous wastes were being dumped ... regardless of the bank's actual or
constructive knowledge, the bank's security interest will have soured into a heavy
liability without much culpability or profit on the part of the bank. However, CERCLA
imposes this kind of retroactive liability on other categories of responsible parties
who are no more closely connected with a particular site.
Comment, supra note 6 at 10168 (footnotes omitted). The author of the Comment also made the
following observation:
The court [in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust] observed that it would
not rule as a matter of law that McLeod Sr.'s disposal of hazardous waste was
connected to the bank's contractual relationship with him without knowing whether
there were loans outstanding to him during the 1972-73 period of toxics. It also
discussed that the bank knew about McLeod's disposal activities as relating to the
due care issue, not the contractual relationship issue. While it requires several
speculative leaps of deduction, the inference might be drawn that the court would
rule that the temporal overlap of the loans and the disposal would satisfy the contractual relationship test without actual knowledge on the part of the bank about the
activities for which McLeod was using the money.
Id. at 10168 n.47.
107. This was one of the issues of a case filed in the District Court of Harris County, Houston,
Tex., the 152nd Judicial District captioned Joseph Edward Powell v. Pulte Home Corporation, No.
84-75865.
108. [Clourts are reluctant to impose liability even after a reasonable time on current,
nonpolluting owners because of the great costs associated with abating the problems
created by the leakage of chemicals from underground dumpsites. The prevailing
approach now appears to be that courts will primarily consider factors other than
ownership in determining who should bear liability for the contamination. In actions
involving private litigants, this trend would allow a succeeding landowner to be
relieved of liability if he or she did not know of the earlier waste disposal on the
land ....
However, sometimes a failure to take reasonable steps to abate the known
nuisance may render an otherwise innocent purchaser liable for the nuisance.
Comment, Changes in the Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Original and Successor
Liability, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 691, 708 (1984) (hereinafter Changes in Ownership).
109. The three cases are: State of N.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985);
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d t42 (1978),
affd sub nom., Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980);
State, Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super, 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
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degree of knowledge held by the subsequent landowner of past activities
on the land tempered by any actions taken by the subsequent owner after
knowledge was gained to abate the hazardous situation. "' The case holdings were reflected in the Superfund liability provisions."'
State of New York v. Shore Realty Corporation
In February 1984, the State of New York brought suit under CERCLA
against Shore Realty Corporation and Donald LeoGrande, its sole officer
and stockholder, to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site." 2 The
property had been purchased by Shore Realty Corporation for development." 3 The relevant facts are as follows:" 4 On July 14, 1983, Shore
Realty Corporation contractually agreed to purchase 3.2 acres of property
located at One Shore Road, Shore Realty Corporation being formed solely
to purchase the land. At the time of the purchase, LeoGrande was aware
that the then current tenants were illegally operating a hazardous waste
storage facility on the property. On October 13, 1983, Shore Realty
Corporation took title to the property. From October 13, 1983, to January
5, 1984, nearly ninety thousand gallons of hazardous chemicals were
added to the site. On January 5, 1984, the tenants who were operating
the facility on the site were evicted. It was estimated that, as of January
5, 1984, seven hundred thousand gallons of hazardous chemicals were
on the premises.
Shore Realty Corporation denied responsibility claiming that it was not
covered by CERCLA since it "neither owned the site at the time of
disposal nor caused the presence or the release of the hazardous waste
at the facility." ' " The court rejected Shore Realty Corporation's argument
and imposed CERCLA liability." 6 The basis of imposing liability on Shore
110. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1037. "It is generally held that the liability of the subsequent
landowner is limited unless they had accepted or associated themselves with the creation of the
maintenance of the harmful conditions on the property." Changes in Ownership, supra note 108, at
709.
Ill. See notes 35 to 42 and accompanying text.
112. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d at 1037. While not a state court decision based upon a state
mini-superfund statute, the case does demonstrate that knowledge of hazardous chemicals on site at
the time of the purchase may trigger Superfund liability as an owner and responsible party.
113. Id. The case does not indicate what type of development was planned.
114. The facts of Shore Realty Corp. are set out in the case at 1037-1039.
115. Id. at 1043.
116. Id. at 1045.
It is quite clear that if the current owner of a site could avoid liability merely by
having purchased the site after chemical dumping had ceased, waste sites certainly
would be sold, following the cessation of dumping, to new owners who could avoid
the liability otherwise required by CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that persons
who dump or store hazardous waste sometimes cannot be located or may be deceased
or judgment-proof.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Realty Corporation was the knowledge Shore Realty Corporation had of
the presence of the hazardous substances,' knowledge which successfully blocked any third-party defenses." 8 The court held that the limitation

of landowner liability "clearly does not extend to successor owners who
knew about the condition of the land before purchasing it.

'

Limited Liability
There are cases in state courts which show the concern for subsequent
landowners by limiting the liability of successor landowners. 20 Both
Philadelphia Chewing Gum v. Commonwealth' and New Jersey Dep't
of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp.'2 2 were brought under state
mini-Superfund statutes; however, their application to federal Superfund
liability litigation was recognized in the Superfund Section 301(e) Study
Group Report to Congiress 2' and in SARA provisions. The cases generally
follow the common law analysis which bases liability upon the level of
knowledge possessed by the successor owner and the subsequent actions
taken to abate the condition once knowledge is acquired.' 24 Unlike the
situation in State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp. in which the successor
owner had knowledge of the hazardous waste on the land prior to purchase, the two cases illustrate a situation in which the subsequent landowner discovers the existence of hazardous substances after the purchase.
It is a situation in which the subsequent purchasers truly are "innocent"
subsequent landowners at the time of purchase and know nothing of the
existence of hazardous waste even after diligent search.'25
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth." The issue
117. Id. at 1048 n.23.
While we need not reach the issue, Shore appears to have a contractual relationship
with the previous owners that also blocks the defense. The purchase agreement
includes a provision by which Shore assumed at least some of the environmental
liability of the previous owners.
id.
118. Id. at 1051.
It is immaterial ... that other parties placed the chemicals on this site; Shore
purchased it with knowledge of its condition-indeed of the approximate cost of
cleaning it up-and with an opportunity to clean up the site. LeoGrande knew that
the hazardous waste was present without the consent of the State or its DEC, but
failed to take reasonable steps to abate the condition.
Id.
119. Id. at 1050 n.25.
120. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142
(1978), affd sub nom., Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37
(1980), and State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339
(N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
121. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 387 A.2d 142.
122, State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 376 A.2d 1339.
123. See Report, supra note 12.
124. See supra notes 35 to 42 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 40.
126. 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978), aff'd sub noma., Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc.
v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).
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in Philadelphia Chewing Gum was whether a landowner was liable for
the cleanup of a condition existing on his land which was caused by an
adjacent landowner. 27 Pentachlorophenol mixed with oil was found in
groundwater under, at, and near the area involved. 2 ' The area included
two tracts of land separated by a road running southwest to northeast.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation owned property on the southeast
side of the road. 29 The property on the northeast side of the road was
owned by Clifford and Virginia Rogers who had leased a majority of the
property to National Wood Preservers, Inc., a wood preservative business. 3° The balance of the Rogers' property was leased to Shell Oil
Company for a gasoline station.' 3' The presence of chemicals in the
groundwater originated on and in the property leased to National Wood
Preservers, Inc. and Shell Oil Company and flowed through Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corporation's property and into a stream.' 32
The Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board found that none of
the current occupiers, Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation, National
Wood Preservers, Inc., or Shell Oil Company, contributed to the pollution
of the groundwater,'33 but that the previous owner's activities caused the
introduction of pentachlorophenol and oil into the groundwater.' 34 Since
the present occupiers of the land had no knowledge of the condition nor
127. Id. 387 A.2d at 144.
At the heart of these consolidated appeals is the following fundamental question:
Under what circumstances may the Commonwealth order a landowner or an occupier
of land to correct a condition existing on his land which is causing pollution of
Commonwealth waters, where such polluting condition was created by the conduct
of someone other than the owner or occupier?
Id.
128. Id.387 A.2d at 145.
129. Id.387 A.2d at 144.
130. Id.
131. Id.387 A.2d at 144-45,
132. Id. "Pentachlorophenol mixed with oil flows, mostly on top of the water table, under the
surface of the property of Rogers' and leased, in part to Shell and in part to Wood. This
material then flows in a southwesterly direction under Eagle Road .... Pentachlorophenol
mixed with oil flows, mostly on top of the water table, under the surface of the property of
Gum. This material then infiltrates the storm sewer pipe which is maintained by the Township
...and is discharged to Naylors Run at the terminus of this pipe."
Id.
133. Id.
In its adjudication, EHB concluded that the 'condition' which is present in this
case is 'the presence of pentachlorophenol mixed with oil' under the surface of
appellants' land. EHB found as fact, however, the neither Wood .... nor Shell,
nor Gum had 'discharged or permitted the discharge of industrial waste to the waters
of the Commonwealth.' (quoting the Environmental Hearing Board).
Id.
134. Id.387 A.2d at 146.
Given the specific findings of fact that neither Wood, under Goldstein, nor Gum
nor Shell has discharged any industrial waste into Commonwealth waters, we must
conclude that the presence of pentachlorophenal under the land of these appellants
is a direct result of Jacoby's activities prior to and including the year 1956.
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had taken part in the creation of the present condition, the court, accepting
the Environmental Hearing Board's findings, declined to impose liability.
However, the court did outline the situations in which the "innocent"
' The court stated
occupier could be ordered to take corrective measures. 35
that liability would be predicated upon the knowledge and positive association of the parties, beyond mere ownership or occupancy, to the condition of the land. 36 Mere ownership status was insufficient in and of
'
itself to cause liability to attach. 37
State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp." In State, Dep't
of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp.,' 3 9 the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection brought suit against Exxon Corporation and ICI
America, Inc. under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control
Act" ° for remedial action to cleanup the petroleum pollution and correct
any further emanation of the petroleum pollution. Exxon Corporation
owned a tract of land, approximately 320 acres, in Bayonne, New Jersey
since 1898.'" Exxon Corporation used the property for refining, storing
and trans-shipping crude oil and other petroleum products. 42 During the
time of Exxon Corporation's ownership, oil was spilled, permitted to
leak, and was intentionally dumped at the site.""
Over a period of four years ending in 1969, Exxon Corporation sold
approximately 35 acres of the site to ICI America, Inc.'" The New Jersey
135. Id. 387 A.2d at 150.
Where the polluting condition is created by the conduct of an individual other than
the owner or occupier, the owner or occupier of the land on which the condition
exists cannot be liable to take corrective measures ... on the basis of the bare fact
of ownership or occupancy. Such an owner or occupier can be ordered to take
corrective measures, however, if he permitted or authorized the creation of the
condition on his land. Such an owner or occupier can also be ordered to take
corrective measures if he (1) knows or should have known of the existence of the
condition on the land; and (2) associates himself in some positive respect, beyond
mere ownership or occupancy, with the condition after its creation. The key to
imposing liability . . . upon an owner or occupier for the correction of a condition
which he did not create is that such an owner or occupier, after knowing of the
condition, engages in some affirmative conduct indicating his adoption of the condition. Essentially, this theory of liability for owners or occupiers who do not create
the condition is an application ... of the common law liability of owners or occupiers
who 'continue' or 'adopt' a nuisance not created by them.
Id.
136. Id. 387 A.2d at 150-51.
137. id. 387 A.2d at 150.
138. 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
139. See supra note 24.
140. N.J. Star. Ann. §§58:10-23.11 to 58:10-23.1lz (West 1982 and Supp. 1985).
141. State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., at 469, 376 A.2d at 1341.
142. Id. at 469, 376 A.2d at 1342.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 469, 376A.2d at 1342. Since acquiring the property, ICI has conducted a manufacturing
operation on the site which does not involve the utilization, storage, handling or transfer of oil, and
ICI has never engaged in any activity which added oil to the condition which existed at the time
the ICI property was purchased from Exxon. Id.
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Department of Environmental Protection obtained an agreement with Exxon
Corporation for Exxon Corporation to cleanup the land which it owned. 45
The Department of Environmental Protection and ICI America, Inc. did
not agree as to the liability of ICI America, Inc.; therefore, each filed
motions for summary judgment as to ICI America, Inc.'s liability for
response costs. '
The court declined to impose liability for response costs on ICI America, Inc. since the Department of Environmental Protection could not
prove causation. 47 The court further held that liability could not be imposed
based on a nuisance theory, The Department of Environmental Protection
argued that "ICI is chargeable with maintaining a nuisance because after
acquiring the subject property it learned of the existence of the nuisance
and it has done nothing to remedy it." 4 ' The court rejected the argument
based on the general rule that the creator of the nuisance (Exxon Corporation) remained liable for the nuisance even after alienating the property; 49 therefore, ICI America, Inc. could not be held liable for response
costs merely because it happened to own a polluted site. 150
LIMITING SUPERFUND LIABILITY
In light of the case law under Superfund and state mini-superfund
provisions, it is clear that a foreclosing financial institution may be held
liable for response costs and for the consequential damages to the environment. It is equally clear that the sophisticated lender will also take
steps to limit its exposure to Superfund liability. Since there is only one
sure way of preventing the imposition of Superfund liability, not wholly
145. Id. at 469, 376 A.2d at 1341 ("With regard to defendant Exxon, a stipulation of dismissal
was previously filed with this court which requires that Exxon remedy the petroleum pollution
problems which exist on its property.....). The Government would not dismiss the charges against
ICI America, Inc.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 477-478, 376 A.2d at 1346.
Under the circumstances of this case it appears that causation cannot be shown
between any act of ICI and the resultant harm. ICI acquired its property between
1965 and 1969. By then almost seven decades had gone by under Exxon's ownership
in which the land was despoiled by spillage of oil by Exxon. These acts so contaminated the ground that some 7,000,000 gallons of oil lie under the surface of the
35 acres purchased by ICI. However, ICI had no control over the land while the
oil was being deposited thereon by Exxon and thus could not have prevented it.
Therefore, no causal relation can be found between ICI's acts and the oil originally
deposited on the land by Exxon and now seeping into the waters of the State.
Id.
148. Id. at 484, 376 A.2d at 1349.
149. Id. at 484, 376 A.2d at 1349. The general rule only applies when the nuisance in question
is a latent nuisance, i.e., the grantor must disclose any latent defect or dangers he knows or should
know will not be discovered by the grantee. See United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1953); Beall v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 532 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, §§ 352 and 353 (1977).
150. State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super at 484, 376 A.2d at 1349.
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acceptable, 5 ' future loan negotiations with specified industrial concerns
will likely deal with provisions providing for indemnification, environmental risk assessments, and environmental audits, along with warranty
representations. 52 All must be done without the lender becoming involved
in the day-to-day operations of the industrial borrower.'53
Under the provisions of Superfund, it is permissible for a lender to
negotiate and secure an indemnification agreement, triggered by foreclosure and EPA cleanup, from the borrower.'5 4 The negotiated indemnification clause may be rendered useless to the lender, however, if the lender
does not somehow insure compliance with the applicable environmental
laws by requiring initial environmental assessment and periodic followup environmental audits as a part of the loan package. The initial assessment and subsequent audits may well become standard negotiated prerequisites to the disbursement of loan proceeds in light of the high standard
of due diligence and care required in the commercial transaction.' 55 The
assessment does not come without a price tag, for the more exacting the
initial assessment, the higher the initial cost. However, the cost of the
initial assessment will be money well spent if the assessment demonstrates
that the proposed site is already contaminated and in need of cleanup,
for the lender may then decide not to risk exposure to Superfund liability.
While the initial cost may be high, the benefits to the lender and the
borrower justify the costs. The lender benefits from the initial assessment
by becoming fully aware of the condition of the property on which the
loan is made. The lender may then decide either to forego the loan or
proceed with the transaction. The follow-up audits will alert the lender
to potential problems after the loan is made and better enable the lender
to protect its security interest in the property. The borrower also benefits
from the assessment and audits since the knowledge of potential problems
151. It seems that the only way a lender can truly insure insulation from Superfund liability is
by declining to make loans to designated industrial concerns which create hazardous waste. The
high risk of liability has already forced many smaller lenders to refuse to loan money to these
industrial borrowers.
152. Fear of a hidden Superfund site or acquiring a business with hidden environmental
problems has driven all but the most obtuse management to reflect upon what it
should do to protect itself. It simply no longer makes good business sense to take
a laissez faire approach to environmental problems. Responsible managers are
demanding assurance on environmental risks. Many are requiring a system to detect
environmental risks and verify compliance with applicable internal and external
controls. The vehicle used to attain these goals is a rapidly growing discipline called
environmental auditing.
Earl, Environmental Auditing: What Your Client Doesn't Know Hurts the Most, LX FLA. B. J. n.47

(Jan. 1986).
153. As discussed earlier, such involvement in the day-to-day operations of the borrower would
expose the lender to liability under the more liberal Mirabile test.
154. 42 U.S.C. §9607(e) (1982). See supra notes 71 to 80 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 42.
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will allow the borrower to correct the problems before it reaches the
critical stage in which the EPA and Superfund would intervene. Further,
compliance with assessments and audits may target the industrial borrower
as a "good environmental risk" making it easier to secure new loan
benefits.
Initial Environmental Assessments
When an industrial concern goes to a lender to borrow money for
activities connected with the business, the lender runs a risk of Superfund
liability. The exposure to risk puts the lender in a position to require
initial environmental assessment, with the loan itself being contingent
upon the completion and analysis of the environmental assessment. The
decision by the lender to require an environmental assessment to be
performed by a qualified entity'56 is a wise one as it will provide information upon which the lender may assess initial potential for Superfund
liability in the event the lender must foreclose upon its security interest.
Two questions immediately present themselves: 1) When should the
assessment take place; and 2) What information should be required in the
assessment.
The timing of the assessment, for maximum benefit to the lender, should
take place prior to the lender becoming obligated to disburse the loan.
The lender could easily make loan disbursement contingent upon an
analysis which demonstrates a lack of contamination at the site. Further,
the specific mechanics of the assessment may dictate the timing for a
particular transaction. There is also some question as to whether a lender
would be adequately protecting itself under the due diligence standard if
the assessment were to take place upon foreclosure instead of at the time
the loan is initially made. Since the EPA would surely argue that the
foreclosing lender is in the same shoes as the purchaser the lender is
foreclosing on, the question becomes: Does the "foreclosure purchase"
relate back to the making of the loan? The EPA would argue that the
foreclosure is a purchase that does relate back under the contractual
relations definition to the time of the initial loan.' 57
Should the lender wait to the time of foreclosure to make the environmental assessment, the lender would be faced with the decision of either
foregoing foreclosure or of foreclosing and exposing itself to Superfund
liability as the lender would be under the "good commercial or customary
practice" standard. 58 Therefore, the lender would be wise to require the
156. The qualified entity generally will provide services in a wide enough range so that the
assessment will be specifically tailored to the needs of the lender and the borrower.
157. See supra notes 35 to 39 and accompanying text.
158. See 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35) (West Supp. 1987).
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environmental assessment up front and not make the assessment contingent upon foreclosure.
What then are the mechanics of the environmental assessment? The
first step is one that is already required of most large loans made on real
estate, a title search. The title search will provide a point of reference
for further testing if the title search discloses that the land was once
owned by an industrial concern which produced hazardous waste byproducts. The second step involved, regardless of what the title search
reveals, is an actual walk-through of the property by a qualified environmental risk assessor. The walk-through can also provide a reference
point for specific testing of the site. The third step would then involve
the testing of the site by whatever means determined by the walk-through
to be necessary, that is, general hydrological and/or geological, or merely
substance specific. The final step would be a written analysis submitted
to the requisite parties. The initial assessment, while providing valuable
decision information to the lender, may also provide the basis for the
subsequent environmental audits.
Subsequent Environmental Audits
The EPA has recognized the value of the environmental audit as a tool
to promote an increase in compliance with environmental laws and regulations. 5' 9 The EPA has defined environmental auditing as "a systematic,
documented, periodic, and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements. " " A successful environmental audit program also requires the
assurances of compliance on the part of the borrower to the lender. The
assurance of compliance must be carried out without the lender becoming
substantially involved in the day-to-day operations of the borrower.
A successful program will be tailored to the individual, specific needs
159.

In developing compliance strategies under the environmental statutes, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found that traditional administrative and judicial enforcement efforts are not always sufficient to achieve a high
level of compliance from all regulated entities, including industry, municipalities,
and federally-owned facilities. This has become particularly apparent under the
environmental programs that regulate hazardous wastes and toxic substances. To

address this issue, EPA has explored the concept of environmental auditing as an
innovative approach to promote increased compliance by the regulated community.
Danzig, Walker, & Price, Environmental Auditing: Reaching the Bottom Line in Compliance, NAT.
ENVTL. ENFORCE. J. 3 (Jan. 1987).
160. U.S. EPA, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 FED. REG. 25004 (1986). Danzig,
Walker & Price, supra note 159, at 3. "It [environmental auditing] does not replace environmental
awareness or protection programs: It measures their effectiveness." Earl, supra note 152, at 47
(footnote omitted).
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of the borrower. 6" Various industrial factors and the company's specific
past history will also play a key role in the development of a successful
audit."62 Since the audits are specifically tailored, it is difficult to outline
a general audit program; however, the most important element in the audit
is the support of the company hierarchy. 63 Once the environmental audit
is set up and operational, lenders will feel more comfortable in making
loans to industrial borrowers who demonstrate a commitment to a successful environmental audit program since the lenders will have a history
available to them regarding the particular borrower's past record.
CONCLUSION
Since the passage of Superfund in 1980, financial institutions have
wrestled with the Superfund liability provisions and have generally won,
keeping sufficient distance to avoid liability; however, recent court decisions and the Superfund amendments have left financial institutions in a
state of fear and uncertainty as to their exposure to Superfund liability.
The lenders must find a way to insulate themselves from Superfund
liability. This path will lead the lender to negotiate for environmental
assessments prior to the disbursement of funds for loans to the specific
industrial customers. The path will also dictate that the lender require the
implementation of an environmental audit program to continue compliance with environmental regulations. The lender that successfully negotiates these concessions from the industrial borrower will be in a far better
position than the lender who does not properly weigh the risks involved.
In Superfund liability, as in real life, the foolish and their money are
soon parted. The lender who does not take steps to adequately assess
Superfund risks prior to loan disbursement is extremely foolish and is
likely to be forced to part with large amounts of money for the response
costs.

A successful auditing program must be tailored to the needs of a specific organization. What's appropriate for a phosphate company will not be appropriate for
Mom and Pop Drum Recycling Company. The scope, goals, strategies, staffing,
and procedures must be designed to meet specific needs.
The program chosen depends upon such factors as: (I) particular objectives; (2)
available resources; (3) company structure and size; (4) environmental impacts; (5)
past history and compliance; and (6) the desirability of confidentiality.
Earl, supra note 152, at 48 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id.
163. "The key component in any successful audit is generally recognized to be the support of
top management. Only with that support can independence and follow-up be assured." Id.
161.

